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ABSTRACT 
In order to stabilise and improve their income situation, rural households are strongly encouraged to 
diversify their activities both within and outside the agricultural sector. Often, however, this advice is 
only moderately pursued. This paper addresses issues of rural household income diversification in the 
case of Poland. It investigates returns from rural household income strategies using propensity score 
matching methods and extensive datasets spanning 1998-2008. Results suggest that returns from 
combining farm and off-farm activities were lower than returns from concentrating on farming or on 
self-employment outside agriculture. This differential is stable over time although returns from 
diversification have relatively improved after Poland’s accession to the EU. This is also visible in the 
fact that since 2006 returns from combining farm and off-farm activities have evened with returns 
from relying solely on hired off-farm labour, thus smoothing the difference observed before the 
accession. Further, over the analysed period, households pursuing the diversification strategy 
performed better than those relying solely on unearned income. Finally, in general, the income in 
households combining farm and off-farm activities was higher than in those combining two off-farm 
income sources.  
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1. Introduction 
While important differences across countries can be observed, many rural areas in the 
European Union (EU) face significant challenges. Most importantly, compared to urban 
regions, rural areas show a lower degree of socio-economic development.1 This translates, 
inter alia, into lower levels of income, lower employment rates or lower attainment of tertiary 
education (European Commission, 2011). These problems seem to be particularly prevalent 
in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) (Macours & Swinnen, 2008). In 
comparison to the situation in the old EU member states, rural areas in the CEECs are 
characterised by a greater share of people at risk of poverty, higher dependence on 
agriculture or a wider gap between rural and urban GDP per capita (European Commission, 
2011).  
In response to this, one of the main objectives of the rural development policy in the EU in 
general, and in many of the CEECs in particular, is to improve the quality of life in rural areas 
by encouraging diversification of the rural economy.2 This mainly focuses on creating non-
agricultural job opportunities both for farmers as well as the landless rural population. In the 
former case, multifunctional agriculture is often encouraged. In the latter case, on the other 
hand, off-farm activities totally unrelated to farming are supported. The policy measures to 
this end include ‘support for diversification into non-agricultural activities’, ‘support for the 
creation and development of micro-enterprises’, ‘provision of basic services for the economy 
and rural population’ or ‘support for village renewal and development’.  
It is believed that these measures will help to unlock the potential of rural areas and boost 
their development. Thanks to this, a more coherent and more sustainable framework for 
growth at national level is expected. Moreover, expanding the non-agricultural sector in rural 
areas is often associated with structural changes that occur with economic development 
(Winters et al., 2010). Consequently, diversification is often advocated from a 
macroeconomic perspective. In addition, a number of micro-level motives for diversification 
could be mentioned. From this view, diversification is presented as a natural response to 
various market failures, an important tool to manage risk or a way to cope with adverse 
shocks (e.g. Haggblade et al., 2010). Thus, diversification is believed to contribute to 
stabilisation of income flows and consumption at the household level. In case of the CEECs, 
                                                        
* Jan Fałkowski is Assistant Professor at the University of Warsaw and CEAPS, Faculty of Economic 
Sciences, Warsaw, Poland. Maciej Jakubowski and Paweł Strawiński are Assistant Professor at the 
University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Warsaw, Poland. 
1 The very same problem could also be observed outside the EU, especially in developing countries.  
2 “Improving the quality of life in rural areas and encouraging diversification of economic activity” is 
one of the three aims of the EU rural development policy. As far as the programming period 2007-13 is 
concerned, at EU-27 level, this objective represents 13.3% of the total rural development spending 
(€12.8 billion in nominal terms). For the EU-12 (i.e. CEECs plus Malta and Cyprus) this share is higher 
and accounts for 19.3% (€7.2 billion in nominal terms; see Annex E in European Commission, 2011). 
For more on the orientation of rural development spending among CEECs, see also Ramniceanu & 
Ackrill (2007).  
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diversification has been additionally advocated since farms in these countries have been 
expected to achieve a post-EU accession increase in productivity with a net decline in 
agricultural employment (Chaplin et al., 2004). In this context, diversification has been 
promoted as a measure to absorb some of the surplus of farm labour. 
At the same time however, the benefits of programmes encouraging farms to undertake non-
agricultural activities are often questioned. Some experts argue that rural inhabitants are 
rational profit maximisers and that forcing them to diversify outside agriculture will distort 
rural and agricultural markets away from their optimal levels. Furthermore, financial 
encouragement to diversify may lead to overdependence of rural inhabitants on 
governmental support. Last but certainly not least, the correlation between the share of non-
farm income and total household income is far from obvious and it may be positive, negative 
or zero. This in turn raises the question whether encouraging diversification is rational from 
the efficiency of public spending point of view.  
Having said that, it seems important to gain a better understanding of the returns to various 
income strategies in rural areas and to evaluate these two contrasting views using evidence 
from the data. This paper aims to provide such evidence. We focus on Poland, which seems to 
be a very interesting case for analysing how income diversification compares to other 
income-generating strategies in rural areas. This is because of both the scope and scale that 
diversification measures may potentially achieve. Rural areas in Poland contain over 38% of 
the total population and cover roughly 93% of the territory (RDP, 2010).3 Average disposable 
income per capita of rural households is close to 70% of the average income in urban areas 
and has remained at this level for the last decade (Table 1). The dependence on agriculture is 
one of the highest in the European Union, while the service sector is less developed. 
Moreover, most remote areas are being depopulated due to a lack of economic and social 
opportunities. As a consequence, an unfavourable demographic situation is likely to limit 
their growth opportunities and sustainability.  
Table 1. Average nominal disposable monthly income per capita (PLN)* in rural areas and 
farm households 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Rural areas 483.03 512.34 526.85 539.98 555.70 592.83 659.29 744.44 835.85 
Farm 455.99 497.54 571.83 474.31 541.00 606.17 689.75 846.76 887.35 
Farm/rural 94% 97% 109% 89% 97% 102% 105% 114% 106% 
Urban areas 695.00 731.55 754.73 819.27 847.58 866.46 943.90 1,043.71 1,176.11 
Rural/urban 69% 70% 70% 66% 66% 68% 69% 71% 71% 
Whole Poland 610.51 644.48 664.21 680.50 735.40 761.46 834.68 928.87 1,045.52 
* PLN stands for the Polish złoty, the currency in Poland. In 2008 (2000) 1 EUR= 3.51 (4.01) PLN. 
Source: CSO (2013) and own calculations based on the Household Budget Surveys. 
These challenges have been reflected in the composition of the Polish rural development 
policy, in which various diversification measures have played an important role both before 
and after Poland joined the EU and have been embraced by the Common Agricultural Policy 
(see, for example, SAPARD, 2007; SPO 2008; RDP, 2010). As a meaningful illustration, one 
could cite the fact that in the current financial perspective (2007-13), funds allocated to 
promote diversification in Poland account for roughly 20% of the total rural development 
                                                        
3 In Poland, rural areas are defined as those located outside the administrative boundaries of towns 
and cities. Note that this definition is different from that used by the OECD or Eurostat, where rural 
areas are delimited based on the population density criteria. According to the latter approaches, rural 
areas in Poland cover 91% or 86% of the territory respectively (RDP, 2010). For a related discussion, 
see also Henningsen (2009).  
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spending, which is one of the highest shares in the EU member states (European 
Commission, 2011).4  
Interestingly, notwithstanding these efforts, there is evidence that some households resist 
diversification strategies due to a preference for agriculture (Chaplin et al., 2004). Moreover, 
according to official statistics, starting from 2005 the average farmer’s income is constantly 
above the average observed in rural areas (Table 1). This in turn questions the legitimacy of 
encouraging farmers to look for income outside agriculture from the profit-maximisation 
perspective.  
While some studies have investigated the barriers to diversification in rural Poland (see, for 
example, Wilkin, 2003; Chaplin et al., 2004; Błąd, 2006; Chaplin et al., 2007), there have 
been hardly any attempts to compare returns to income strategies of rural households. This 
paper is an attempt to fill this gap and provides a comparison of returns to various income 
strategies adopted by Polish rural households during the transition. More specifically, the 
paper examines how combining farm and off-farm employment (that is relying on diversified 
income) has compared with other income strategies adopted by rural households in Poland. 
Such information is needed to evaluate the rationale of governmental programmes aimed at 
stimulating farmers to diversify outside agriculture. It should also help in explaining labour 
adjustments in rural areas that were observed in Poland during transition period (Dries & 
Swinnen, 2002; Swinnen et al., 2005). Finally, by highlighting the most profitable rural 
income sources, we aim to contribute to the ongoing discussions about the design of new 
rural development policy, both in Poland and at the broader EU level.  
To reach this goal, we use Household Budget Surveys conducted by the Polish Central 
Statistical Office (CSO), covering the period between 1998 and 2008. Taking into account 
that Poland joined the EU in May 2004, we not only cover an important part of the transition 
process, but also the pre- and the post-accession period. Thus, the time coverage of our data 
allows us to highlight the impact of the introduction of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) on rural/agricultural incomes. Importantly, we evaluate not only the impact of the 
CAP on farm incomes alone, but also the relative position of farmers towards other income-
earning opportunities in rural areas. To address the concerns about differences in 
background characteristics of rural household undertaking different income strategies, 
propensity score matching methods are used. These methods allow us to balance these 
characteristics before comparing outcomes. In other words, our estimates take into account 
that rural households differ in their composition, physical and human capital, and compare 
income after adjusting for these differences. As in most cases these background 
characteristics are not policy amenable, they should be taken into account when assessing 
how policies could affect choices of rural households. To our knowledge, this is the first study 
concerned with rural areas in Central and Eastern Europe that uses such an approach to 
balance background characteristics before comparing incomes.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents some background discussion of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 describes methodology and section 4 discusses data. Section 5 
presents the obtained results on returns from various income strategies, and section 6 
summarises our findings and concludes.  
2. Literature review 
2.1 Theoretical explanations for income diversification 
Economic literature addresses a wide range of questions concerned with the underlying 
decisions of rural households’ income strategy. As far as income diversification is concerned, 
economic theory provides multiple explanations that could be used to account for this 
                                                        
4 With this share Poland ranks third among the EU member states only after Bulgaria and Romania. In 
nominal terms, Poland has decided to support diversification of rural areas to the tune of €2.7 billion, 
which is the highest amount in the whole EU (Annex E in European Commission, 2011).  
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phenomenon (see Barrett et al., 2001; or Ellis, 2000 for an excellent survey of this field). 
Below we briefly review them.  
To start with, households may want to diversify their incomes in the presence of insurance 
market failures. In this case, income diversification is used as a risk reduction strategy as 
under uncertainty, risk-averse decision-makers have incentives to spread the risk over many 
activities (e.g. Samuelson, 1967). From this perspective, merging agricultural and non-
agricultural incomes provides two kinds of benefits. First, it helps to manage risks ex ante. 
Second, it helps to cope with adverse shocks ex post.   
Further, income diversification could be seen as a response to credit market failures. Note 
that rural credit markets are often severely underdeveloped as compared to credit markets in 
urban centres. As a result, a number of rural households are credit constrained (e.g. Barry & 
Robinson, 2001). In this context, complementing agricultural income with non-agricultural 
earnings may either help to acquire long-term investment capital or provide liquidity for 
financing the purchase of production inputs.  
Moreover, a household’s decision to diversify income could be seen from the perspective of 
land market failures. Note that in the presence of barriers on land markets (e.g. Deininger & 
Feder, 2001), agricultural households will have limited opportunities to expand and develop. 
In this situation, they will face the problem of diminishing returns to various production 
inputs, including labour. In such a setting, they will send part of their labour force into non-
agricultural activity.  
In addition, income diversification may result from product markets failures. Given the fact 
that rural areas have limited transport and communication infrastructure, the transaction 
costs of supplying them with non-farm goods are high. Consequently, rural households may 
want to diversify outside agriculture in order to satisfy own demand for diversity in 
consumption. This factor is likely to play an important role, especially in the setting with 
growing farm households’ income. This is because, with growing incomes, demand for non-
food items will increase (the so-called Engel’s law).  
While the above-mentioned factors seem to force rural households to diversify their incomes 
so as to overcome various problems or shortcomings, economic theory provides us also with 
arguments that present income diversification not only as a must but as an opportunity. Most 
importantly, income diversification is a normal course of events in the presence of economies 
of scope, i.e. in the situation when the same inputs produce greater per-unit profits when 
spread across multiple outputs than when dedicated to any one output. Multifunctional 
agriculture such as combining milk production with agro-tourism based on cheese 
production could serve here as an example. Moreover, we would expect households to 
diversify their income to benefit from the fact that various household members may have a 
comparative advantage in different occupations. This should result in various household 
members specialising in different activities depending on their skills and available 
technologies. In such a setting, diversifying income again maximises household profits and 
could be seen as a first-best solution.  
It should additionally be noted that, except for these micro-founded motives for income 
diversification, economic theory also suggests a number of reasons for looking at 
diversification from a macro perspective. Most importantly, it has been observed that 
economic growth is accompanied by the change in the sectoral composition of the economy, 
with non-agricultural activities gaining importance at the expense of agricultural ones. In 
what follows income diversification is often presented as part and parcel of economic 
development (Winters et al., 2010). 
2.2 Empirical evidence 
As mentioned above, a number of theoretical explanations for income diversification could be 
offered. Which of these theories holds in practice is an empirical matter. Thus, below we 
briefly review the existing empirical evidence on both determinants and effects of income 
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diversification. Given that our focus is on Poland, we mainly concentrate on the evidence 
from transition countries. Where the latter is only scanty or non-existent, we refer to findings 
from other countries.  
Four strands of the empirical literature seem to be of particular importance to this study. The 
first strand focuses on examining factors stimulating or discouraging off-farm activities. The 
existing studies provide evidence that both endogenous and exogenous factors matter in the 
diversification decision. Research identifying these factors in transition countries brings 
mixed conclusions (see for instance Buchenrieder et al., 2004; Chaplin et al., 2004; Lerman 
et al., 2008; Möllers et al., 2008). For Poland, the level of diversification was negatively 
related to the level of unearned income, the degree of specialisation within agriculture and 
remote localisation (Chaplin et al., 2004). On the other hand, the propensity to diversify was 
positively influenced by the level of education and frequency of public transport. This finding 
corroborates the statement that reallocation of rural labour in Poland was limited by low 
human capital of agricultural labour that constrained intersectoral mobility (Dries & 
Swinnen, 2002). While interesting, much of this literature is based on binomial models and 
thus neglects the whole heterogeneity of occupational choices. As a consequence, the results 
obtained from these models are likely to overlook important differences between off-farm 
income strategies and their outcomes.  
This line of reasoning ties into the second strand of the large body of literature that studies 
off-farm labour supply of farmers (for example Huffman, 1980; Tokle & Huffman, 1991; 
Kimhi, 2000). The existing evidence links household’s choice of its income strategy with two 
broad set of factors. The first set includes personal characteristics and household attributes. 
The second set refers to external factors that are most often reflected by regional 
characteristics. Much of the existing evidence concerns either developed or developing 
countries. In contrast, the evidence on transition countries is very scarce. The few examples 
include Goodwin & Holt (2002) for Bulgaria and Juvancic & Erjavec (2005) for Slovenia. In 
general however, the results from all these studies are quite unanimous. Numerous empirical 
evidences indicate that decisions about labour allocation highly depend on a household’s 
human capital endowments (see, for example, Lass et al., 1991). More specifically, off-farm 
work is first increasing and later decreasing with the age of the head of a household. It is also 
closely related to the level of education of household members (Benjamin, 1994).5 Further, 
patterns of labour allocation are highly dependent on the number of household members in 
working and non-working age (Ahituv & Kimhi, 2006; Kimhi, 1996).6 The specific 
demographic composition of the household (paying special attention to the number of young 
and elderly dependents) is crucial because of the differential income effects resulting from 
the household’s joint budget constraint and costs imposed by different household members 
(Kimhi, 2004; Phimister et al., 2004).7 The impact of access to unearned income sources 
                                                        
5 It is important to mention the findings provided by Ahituv & Kimhi (2006) and Jolliffe (2004), which 
suggest that schooling contributes to higher productivity in off-farm employment rather than in farm 
work. It should also be recalled that Deininger & Olinto (2001) found that more educated households 
are more likely to adopt specialised income-generation strategies. 
6 It could also be noted that a larger family workforce might provide the household with higher social 
capital. The latter point is of particular importance from the point of view of overcoming constraints 
on information acquisition and transmission. It should be noted, however, that the relationship 
between level of income and social capital is not certain. Positive impact of social capital on household 
performance and/or household income was stressed, among others, by Dwyer & Findeis (2008); 
Narayan & Pritchett (1999) and Grootaert (1998). On the other hand, Knack & Keefer (1997) and 
references therein, provide examples where the investigated relationship was negative. 
7 Substitutability or complementarity between the farm labour inputs of different household members 
should also be taken into account here. For instance, Kimhi (1996) indicates the importance of time 
costs imposed on the household by small children. On the other hand, having elderly dependents in 
the household may increase adults’ labour mobility. Further, Kimhi (2004) finds that off-farm 
participation of adults decreases as the number of elderly children rises.  
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should also be recognised here since these are likely to decrease the need for undertaking 
additional activities, either on- or off-farm, by affecting the level of reservation wage.   
The third strand of literature that is relevant to us focuses on the question whether increasing 
rural non-farm employment acts as a catalyst for a broader and inclusive pattern of 
development (see, for example, Lanjouw & Lanjouw, 2001; Reardon et al., 2001). To our 
knowledge, there is no study that addresses these issues for transition countries. Thus, we 
briefly review here the evidence from developing countries. A strong positive relationship 
between the share of non-farm income and total wealth levels was found for African countries 
as well as China (Reardon, 1997; Rozelle et al., 1999). Latin American countries and India 
provide evidence for a U-shaped relationship, indicating that obtaining the highest share of 
non-agricultural employment is a common facet of both poorest and wealthiest households 
(Reardon et al., 2000; Hazell & Haggblade, 1990). On the other hand, Deininger & Olinto 
(2001) found a strong positive association between total income and ‘specialisation’, that is, 
relying only on one main source, either on- or off-farm, in the case of households in 
Colombia. 
Finally, the fourth strand of literature has investigated adjustments in agricultural labour 
during transition. On the one hand, it has been argued that the central planning system left in 
its aftermath a huge surplus in agriculture (Brada, 1989; Jackman, 1994). Therefore, it has 
been predicted that market-oriented economic reforms such as price liberalisation and cuts 
in subsidies should lead to an outflow of labour from agriculture and thus be a natural factor 
encouraging income diversification in rural areas. On the other hand, it has been emphasised 
that agriculture played a buffer role during the transition by absorbing the excess labour from 
other sectors and providing food and social security (Seeth et al., 1998; Lerman et al., 2004; 
Macours & Swinnen, 2005). The empirical evidence is inconclusive and shows a substantial 
heterogeneity in labour-adjustment patterns across transition countries (Swinnen et al., 
2005). In Poland remarkable regional differentiation could be observed. Dries & Swinnen 
(2002) show that agricultural labour increased in the 1990s in southern and eastern parts, 
whereas in northern and western parts it significantly declined. This seems to suggest that 
small family farms (which prevailed in the former regions) played a buffer role, whereas 
large-scale farms (formerly state-owned, mainly present in the north and west of Poland) laid 
off agricultural workers during the transition.8 While this literature provides an interesting 
picture of the agricultural labour-adjustment pattern, it lacks micro-foundations and thus 
does not allow us to study individual incomes and the underlying decisions of their income 
strategies.  
To sum up, the existing literature shows that diversifying outside agriculture does not 
necessarily lead to an increase in income. In fact, several patterns characterising this 
relationship have been identified. We aim at documenting returns from various activities in 
rural Poland so as to see which pattern could be found there. In contrast to much of existing 
studies, we not only distinguish between farm and off-farm income but also control for 
different off-farm strategies.   
3. Methodology 
Our aim is to quantify the average impact of a given income strategy on rural household 
income. A decision to follow an income strategy is possibly non-random. One should rather 
assume that selection into a given strategy depends on household characteristics. Thus, 
unadjusted differences in average income across various groups will give a biased estimate of 
                                                        
8 It should be clearly noted though that agriculture in Poland, in contrast to most other post-
communist countries, has always remained mostly in private hands. Notwithstanding the state’s 
efforts to pursue the Soviet model of farming, the share of collectivised or state-owned land has never 
exceeded 20-25% (Lerman et al., 2004; Lerman & Schreinemachers, 2005). Therefore, although better 
than in the rest of the country, the farm structure in the north and west of Poland remains highly 
fragmented by European standards. 
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the returns to income strategies. To make meaningful comparisons, characteristics should be 
balanced across groups for which financial returns are compared (see, for example, Lee, 
2005). Motivated by the nature of our data and building on the microeconometric evaluation 
literature, we estimate income differentials across rural households using the propensity 
score matching method, which adjusts for observable differences in household characteristics 
and endowments (see, for example, Blundell & Costa-Dias, 2008).  
This method is widely used in empirical economics and other social sciences. The basic idea 
is to mimic a randomised experiment.9 In our context, receiving the ‘treatment’ is equal to 
pursuing a given income strategy. Households in our sample utilise, to various degrees, 
incomes from farming, hired off-farm labour, self-employment outside agriculture and 
unearned income except pensions. We limit our sample to households without pensioners 
(i.e. men over 65 years and women over 60 years) to reduce selection based on labour force 
participation.10 Consequently, we can distinguish between different income strategies. On the 
one hand, we distinguish single-income source households, i.e. those pursuing the 
specialisation strategy in one of the above-mentioned activities. On the other hand, we 
distinguish households with two income sources, i.e. those pursuing the diversification 
strategy, combining two of the activities mentioned above.11 Our focus is on comparing 
returns to diversification strategy that includes income from farming (diversified_farm) with 
returns to any other income strategies, that is, either specialised or diversified but not relying 
on farm income (diversified_non-farm). In other words, our treatment group consists of 
households that have two income sources and one of them is farming. A counterfactual 
control group would consist of otherwise similar households but pursuing one of the 
remaining income strategies, for example, relying solely on farm income or combining hired 
off-farm labour with self-employment.12 To draw a more detailed picture, we also decompose 
the treated group and run separate specifications in which we focus on the relative 
performance only of households combining farming and hired off-farm labour, or only of 
households combining farming and unearned income, or only of households combining 
farming and income from self-employment outside agriculture.  
                                                        
9 Potentially there exist other methods that could be used to mimic randomised experiments. Given the 
nature of our data, however, we could not use them here. More specifically, as we do not use a panel of 
observations we cannot use difference-in-difference techniques. We also do not have any arbitrary 
rules that would be decisive for households’ selection into different income strategies. Thus, we cannot 
rely here on regression discontinuity identification.  
10 We decided not to include pensions, as this income source is not fully comparable to the others. This 
is because pensions are guaranteed on account of advanced years. As such, it is not available to 
households without men/women over 65/60 years. This in turn makes households eligible for 
pensions not fully comparable with households that do not have such a guarantee. Moreover, 
beneficiaries of many pensions and social allowances may not be physically able to engage in profitable 
activities, which makes comparing them with non-pensioners even more problematic. We thank an 
anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this point.  
11 While we could potentially also include households with more than two income sources, we decided 
to restrict our sample to households with either a single source or two sources of income. This is done 
to simplify the analysis. Accounting for households with more than two income sources would greatly 
enlarge the number of comparison groups. Moreover, as these households are not numerous (they 
account for only 6 to 8% of the sample, depending on a year), including them in the analysis  would 
carry the risk of relaying on too few treated/control observations in our matching procedure. That 
said, this obviously has to be kept in mind when interpreting the results.  
12 When comparing outcomes of two groups in cross-sectional data, one can define treated and 
untreated flexibly. However, in practice the propensity score matching works better if the group of 
treated is smaller than the control group. In such a case, a search for good matches in the larger pool of 
subjects is easier and increases the matching quality, as more options are available. Accordingly, in the 
reported comparisons we always refer to treated and controls to denote strategies adopted by fewer 
and more households, respectively. We perform the matching in the opposite direction as a robustness 
check (not reported).  
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An obvious challenge to such an exercise is that classifying as diversified all households with 
two income sources would result in treating households where each income source 
contributes 50% to the total budget in the same way as households where the contribution of 
each income source is less balanced (e.g. 25% and 75%) or totally unbalanced (e.g. 5% and 
95%). Especially in this latter case talking about diversification strategy might be 
inappropriate, notwithstanding the number of income sources. To ensure that our diversified 
households have more-or-less balanced contributions from each of their two sources of 
income, we adopt the following strategy.13 For each household with two income sources, we 
compute a Herfindahl index (HHI), calculated as the sum of squared shares of these two 
income sources. As a diversified household we define a household with HHI smaller or equal 
to 0.58, which corresponds to a situation where the less important income source accounts 
for at least 30% of the total. Whenever it is possible, i.e. whenever we have enough 
observations, we test the robustness of our results to HHI thresholds equal to 0.545 or 0.52, 
which correspond to situations in which the share of the less important income source 
accounts for at least 35% and 40%, respectively. In some cases we additionally control for the 
fact whether farming is a dominant income source or not.  
More formally, we are interested in estimating E(Y1i – Y0i|Xi,Ti = 1), where Y1i is a potential 
outcome measure of household i that adopted a given income strategy, Y0i a counterfactual 
performance of a household with different income strategy, Xi is a set of observable 
covariates, and Ti is an indicator for a given income strategy. This is the ‘average treatment 
on the treated’ (ATT). It measures the effect of a given income strategy on income levels for 
the treated households compared to what would have happened if they would not have 
adopted a given income strategy (that is, they would have relied on different strategy). The 
ATT can be further decomposed to: ATT = E(Y1i|Xi,Ti = 1) - E(Y0i|Xi,Ti = 1). The fundamental 
problem is that, in contrast to the first term, the second term on the right-hand side is not 
observed. Therefore, a counterfactual needs to be constructed. The solution proposed by 
Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) is based on the assumption that conditional on the vector Xi, the 
expected income in the absence of the pursued strategy is the same for treated and untreated 
households. This is the so-called conditional independence assumption which states that the 
set of observables contains all the information about the potential outcome (income in our 
case) in the absence of treatment. In other words, the selection into treatment is not 
dependent on unobservables. Hence, after adjusting for observable characteristics E(Y0i|Xi,Ti 
= 1) = E(Y0i|Xi,Ti = 0). Accordingly, we can replace unobserved incomes in the treated 
households, had they not been treated, with observed incomes in those control households 
that have similar covariates Xi. In order to reduce the large dimension of Xi, we follow 
Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) and instead of conditioning on Xi we condition on p(Xi), which is 
the estimated probability of being treated and is called propensity score. Here we take 
advantage of the second assumption accompanying the matching procedure (the so-called 
common-support assumption) and assume that the propensity score is bounded away from 0 
and 1, assuring that each treated observation would have its counterpart among the 
untreated. 
It should be noted that this procedure assumes that after conditioning on observable 
characteristics there are no systematic differences between households pursuing different 
income strategies. However, as noted by Heckman et al. (1997), this might not be true and 
treated and untreated may differ in unobserved covariates. A potential solution is a 
difference-in-difference matching estimator. In our case, however, this strategy is not feasible 
since longitudinal information on households is not available in our data. This obviously 
should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. That said, it should be noted that our 
set of covariates includes crucial characteristics that are decisive for income strategies (in 
accordance with arguments presented in section 2). Therefore we assume that by balancing 
these characteristics across income groups we control for selection in a majority of the cases.  
                                                        
13 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this to us.  
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Our applied empirical strategy consists of two steps. First, using a probit regression, we 
calculate the propensity score. Second, we use these propensity scores to find good matches 
for treated subjects in the pool of untreated. From several different matching algorithms used 
in applied research, we employ two: that is, nearest neighbour one-to-one matching and local 
linear regression matching (Heckman et al., 1997). The choice of these two estimators could 
be motivated as follows. As noted in the literature (e.g. Smith & Todd, 2005; Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2008), the nearest neighbour 1-to-1 matching is said to be the right choice if there 
are significant differences between the distribution of the propensity score in treated and 
control groups. What should be noted is that for a majority of comparisons that we perform, 
the distributions of propensity score vector for the treated and control groups differ in both 
mean and variance. An obvious shortcoming with using the 1-to-1 matching is that it takes 
advantage of only a part of the non-treated group as the reference group. Therefore, to exploit 
all information available in the data, we additionally use the LLR matching algorithm. This 
algorithm is much better suited to our data than matching estimators based on the 
mahalanobis distance. It also allows us to avoid arbitrary decisions with respect to selecting 
the “n” in 1-to-n matching algorithm. Last but not least, using LLR matching in addition to 1-
to-1 matching could be motivated by the fact that the former are much more suitable if one 
uses bootstrapping to calculate standard errors, which is our case. As noted by Abadie & 
Imbens (2008), bootstrapping does not necessarily deliver consistent estimates in the case of 
the nearest neighbour estimator. Bootstrapping, however, provides valid inference for all 
asymptotically linear estimators, including the local linear regression estimator. Therefore, 
the results based on the local linear regression estimator provide a useful robustness check 
for the results based on nearest-neighbour matching. To improve matching quality we use a 
calliper with a rather restrictive value of 0.005. This means that observations that differ in 
propensity score by more than 0.005 were not considered in matching.14 
To assure the representativeness of our calculations, differences in incomes between treated 
and untreated were adjusted by household probability survey weights. Thus, the results are 
representative to the population of households. To increase comparability across years, we 
adjust each year’s income data so that they are expressed in 2005 prices.15 Standard errors 
were obtained through a clustered bootstrap with primary sampling units re-sampled for 
each bootstrap sample. Finally, to control for potential outliers in income data, we estimate 
average income differences using the trimmed mean of outcomes in the treated and the 
control groups, excluding 1% of extreme observations in each income group.16 Trimming 
provides more robust and more precise results, while the results hold in general for 
calculations based on whole samples.  
4. Data 
Our analysis uses the data from the Household Budget Survey (HBS) conducted annually by 
the Central Statistical Office (CSO) in Poland. This extensive survey includes information on 
household characteristics as well as details of their income, expenditure and assets. The HBS 
is a cross-sectional sample with ca. 32,000 households interviewed each year. For the 
purposes of our study, only rural households were taken into account. Moreover, as 
mentioned earlier, our sample is limited to households with one or two income sources and 
to households without people eligible for pensions. In total, depending on a year, we have 
                                                        
14 This is done to assure that we compare similar objects. This calliper is applied to all our estimations. 
Around 10% of observations are dropped as a consequence, although this share decreases with the size 
of treated and control groups.  
15 The deflators are the European Union’s harmonised indices of consumer prices (HICP). 
16 Koenker & Basset (1978) argue that trimming is greatly superior in the case of non-Gaussian 
distribution. Income distributions are usually highly skewed with numerous outliers affecting statistics 
like the mean (see also Koenker & Portnoy, 1987, for additional discussion). 
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from 5,300 to 8,200 observations at our disposal. The time span of the analysis ranges from 
1998 to 2008 and is dictated by availability, coherency and comparability of the data.17  
Since we are interested in comparing returns from different income strategies in Polish rural 
areas, our dependent variable is the monthly disposable equivalent income per capita in PLN 
deflated to 2005 prices.18 Household equivalent income is based on the total revenues 
divided by the weighted number of household members according to the OECD scale. 
Throughout our analysis we distinguish between the following income strategies. The single-
income source strategies include: relying solely on farming, relying solely on hired off-farm 
employment, relying solely on self-employment outside agriculture and relying solely on 
unearned income other than pensions. The diversified income strategies on the other hand 
include combining two of the above-mentioned earning alternatives. Our focus is on returns 
from diversified strategies where one source of income is farming. As already noted, to define 
diversified households we use the information on the contribution of each income source to 
the total income and assume that the contribution of the less-important income source 
should be at least 30%.  
Tables 2 and 3 report basic statistics, presented separately for each year over the analysed 
period. Table 2 provide some details on the composition of our sample and reports shares of 
households according to their income category. As reported, the most numerous groups of 
households are those specialising in hired off-farm labour and those combining hired off-
farm labour with unearned income. Together they account for 60 to 70% of our sample, 
depending on the year. In contrast, households combining farming and self-employment 
outside agriculture account for less than 1% of our sample.  
Table 2. Sample characteristics: Percentage of rural households with respect to income 
category 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Specialised households            
Hired off-farm labour 21.8 22.2 20.6 19.1 19.1 20.2 21.5 24.9 28.7 30.9 34.5 
Farming 8.9 8.9 11.4 12.5 13.2 13.1 12.1 11.5 10.1 7.5 6.6 
Self-employment outside 
agriculture 3.0 3.0 2.5 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.5 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.8 
Unearned income except 
pensions 10.1 9.5 8.0 7.3 6.6 6.1 6.2 6.3 5.9 4.7 4.5 
Diversified households            
Farming + off-farm labour 7.2 5.9 4.7 4.8 4.2 4.6 4.9 4.5 4.7 4.9 4.9 
Farming + self-employment 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6 
Farming + unearned 6.8 6.9 7.2 7.5 7.4 7.5 6.5 6.0 5.2 5.0 4.3 
Off-farm labour + self-
employment 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.9 3.4 4.0 
Off-farm labour + unearned  37.1 38.7 40.0 39.3 40.0 40.0 40.4 38.2 36.3 37.5 34.7 
Self-employment + unearned 2.0 2.0 2.7 3.4 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.3 2.5 2.0 2.0 
No. of observations 5,372 5,384 6,284 5,309 5,337 5,334 5,394 6,868 8,205 8,129 8,134 
Source: Own computations based on Household Budget Surveys. Unearned income excludes pensions. Only 
households with one or two income sources were taken into account. Households with persons eligible 
for pensions on account of advanced years were not included. 
                                                        
17 Individual-level data concerning earlier periods are not comparable due to the different sampling 
scheme. The more recent surveys are also designed differently in accordance with the EUROSTAT 
methodology. The methodology and the main results of the Household Budget Surveys are described 
in annual publications of the Central Statistical Office. More details on the methodology can be found 
in CSO (1999). 
18 PLN stands for the Polish złoty, the currency in Poland. In 2008 (2000) 1 EUR= 3,51 (4,01) PLN. 





Table 3. Rural household mean equivalent monthly income per person by main source (in PLN deflated to 2005 by HCPI) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Specialised households            
Hired off-farm labour  899,96 901,54 881,03 912,04 871,44 919,22 894,44 931,41 982,49 1078,64 1190,90 
Farm income 763,54 737,94 781,69 799,71 828,50 738,58 760,06 894,51 971,27 1153,00 1190,44 
Self-employment outside agriculture 906,87 931,56 958,75 962,43 946,42 972,95 988,19 973,86 1061,46 1197,39 1263,23 
Unearned income except pensions 458,47 468,27 459,14 478,58 479,77 504,87 491,11 505,75 543,80 581,88 580,75 
            
Diversified households            
Farming + off-farm labour 861,26 835,95 841,96 828,02 871,35 891,34 866,07 954,80 1045,83 1156,99 1229,42 
Farming + self-employment 911,92 833,54 813,89 903,80 896,61 951,89 1003,39 1032,43 1156,28 1174,36 1248,30 
Farming + unearneda 657,06 589,05 599,37 610,58 603,20 594,13 633,14 669,57 703,69 881,66 828,74 
Off-farm labour + self-employment 1063,44 1145,52 1023,76 1111,53 1106,72 1123,84 1090,83 1247,46 1280,68 1424,09 1554,87 
Off-farm labour + unearned  700,17 695,19 696,94 702,56 692,30 693,31 702,38 702,24 756,03 817,38 902,03 
Self-employment + unearned 736,05 748,03 704,63 745,14 816,87 834,22 714,87 733,80 816,19 842,90 899,42 
* Unearned income does not include pensions. 
Source: Own computations based on the annual Household Budget Survey conducted by Poland’s Central Statistical Office (CSO). 
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Table 3, on the other hand, reports an average equivalent income per person in PLN for 
different household types. These averages indicate that over the period under investigation 
the highest returns (1,554 PLN in 2008) could have been obtained from combining off-farm 
hired labour and self-employment outside agriculture. The five following strategies provided 
somewhat lower remuneration (roughly 1,200 PLN in 2008): specialising in self-
employment, combining farming and off-farm labour; combining farming and self-
employment; specialising in farming; and specialising in hired off-farm labour. The least 
profitable strategies in turn appear to be those based at least to some extent on unearned 
income (from 580 to 902 PLN in 2008). These statistics suggest that, compared to other 
strategies, a diversification strategy (i.e. combining two income sources including farming) is 
the best approach to maximise a household’s income. In fact, since 2005, combining farming 
and self-employment or hired off-farm labour ranked in the top four strategies with highest 
remuneration. That said, it has to be kept in mind that this picture is based only on simple 
averages and thus may be misleading. This is because it neglects households’ background 
characteristics and the fact that households may self-select into different income strategies. 
That is why below we present some more systematic evidence based on propensity score 
matching to explore and compare differences in returns from various income strategies 
adopted by Polish rural households.  
A few words are necessary about the specific regressors that we use when calculating the 
propensity score. For any application of propensity score matching, a crucial choice is the 
selection of the appropriate set of covariates for which distributions among compared groups 
have to be balanced. Our set of covariates was carefully established in accordance with the 
theoretical and empirical findings discussed in section 2. Since we aim at analysing returns 
from farming and from off-farm activities, we are particularly interested in characteristics 
shared by all rural households. Therefore, we focus on the following issues: a household’s 
human capital endowments, a household’s demographic composition and regional 
specificities. To capture differences in human capital, we include four dummy variables 
denoting education level of the household’s head: higher education, secondary general 
education, secondary vocational education and vocational education. Those with the lowest 
level of education (lower secondary, primary or none) serve as a baseline category. In 
addition, we control for the level of education among household members other than the 
household head. More specifically, we include two dummies that distinguish households with 
at least one member having the same or higher level of education than the household head, 
respectively. Households where all household members have a lower level of education than 
the household head serve as a reference point. Next, to take into account that the decision 
about income strategy might be strongly related to age and gender, we condition on the 
household head’s age and a dummy variable being equal to one for males and equal to zero 
for females. Further, we also include a variable capturing the household's gender ratio, which 
is defined as the ratio of the number of men to the number of women older than 15 years. 
Moreover, in accordance with the literature showing that income strategy depends on 
household composition, we include two count variables that measure the number of persons 
under the age of 16 and the number of persons who are older than 16 but younger than 65. As 
noted earlier, we consider only households without people eligible for pensions. Taken 
together, these variables also control for the total number of individuals in a household. 
Finally, to capture potential regional differences, we include a set of dummies denoting each 
of the six Polish macro-regions (NUTS 1). To test the robustness of our results and reduce the 
probability of violating the conditional independence assumption, in some specifications we 
also include in our set of covariates the interactions between age, gender and other 
independent variables mentioned above.19  
                                                        
19 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this to us.  




Before reporting our main results, that is, the actual estimates of the returns to different 
income strategies, we begin by showing some diagnostics. Table 4 provides examples of a 
propensity score model that predicts the probability difference between various income 
strategies. Here we report the models predicting the probability difference between a 
diversification strategy that combines two income sources including farming and the 
alternatives of relying solely on a single income source (either farming, hired off-farm 
employment, self-employment outside agriculture or unearned income except pensions).20 
Clearly, explanatory variables included in probit regressions are good predictors of income 
strategy choices. This concerns especially age of the head of the household, his/her gender 
and the level of his/her education. In addition, the choice of income strategy seems to 
strongly depend on a household’s composition both in terms of number of people of different 
ages and the level of education of household members. Given that these variables are also 
likely to affect household income, this result is consistent with non-random selection and 
motivates our empirical strategy.  
                                                        
20 For reasons of brevity, only probit regressions for these comparisons are presented here. Household 
characteristics included in these regressions were also strong predictors for other comparisons. 
Additional results for other comparisons are available upon request.  
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 1998 2003 2008 1998 2003 2008 1998 2003 2008 1998 2003 2008 
Age -0.23 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Gender (1=woman) 0.83 0.86 0.49 0.22 0.16 -0.20 0.56 0.24 0.64 -0.48 -0.83 -0.78 
 (0.21) (0.25) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.30) (0.29) (0.27) (0.21) (0.19) (0.20) 
Gender ratio 0.05 -0.25 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.05 -0.14 -0.35 0.18 0.27 0.08 0.11 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.20) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) 
Higher education 2.04 - 2.33 -2.01 -2.53 -0.99 -2.14 -2.34 -2.10 2.71 2.15 2.68 
 (0.75) - (0.64) (0.44) (0.46) (0.32) (0.68) (0.63) (0.51) (0.83) (0.54) (0.53) 
Secondary general education 0.61 1.96 -0.29 -0.99 -0.76 -1.01 -2.36 -1.80 -2.60 0.84 1.34 1.07 
 (0.49) (0.66) (0.57) (0.43) (0.39) (0.38) (0.61) (0.59) (0.54) (0.56) (0.44) (0.58) 
Secondary vocational education 0.62 0.60 0.19 -1.26 -1.40 -0.58 -2.32 -2.13 -1.95 1.21 0.73 1.18 
 (0.30) (0.37) (0.26) (0.25) (0.29) (0.22) (0.48) (0.45) (0.41) (0.33) (0.30) (0.28) 
Vocational education 0.11 0.32 0.03 -0.71 -0.43 -0.23 -1.56 -0.83 -1.10 0.58 0.69 0.83 
 (0.19) (0.23) (0.21) (0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.39) (0.36) (0.37) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22) 
Education of other hh member as high as the hh head -0.27 0.06 -0.70 0.22 0.09 -0.15 0.63 0.18 -0.08 -0.66 -0.52 -0.79 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.15) (0.31) (0.28) (0.24) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) 
Education of other hh member higher than that of hh 
head  -0.78 0.13 -0.86 0.31 0.76 -0.27 0.85 1.19 0.01 -1.27 -0.81 -1.69 
 (0.28) (0.32) (0.29) (0.25) (0.26) (0.22) (0.39) (0.38) (0.30) (0.29) (0.27) (0.29) 
No of persons under 16 years of age 0.14 0.17 0.25 0.62 0.58 0.44 0.32 0.17 0.40 -0.15 -0.03 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
No of persons 16-65 years of age 0.37 0.59 0.26 0.26 0.45 0.29 0.63 0.60 0.74 0.48 0.44 0.61 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) 
Constant -1.83 -2.70 -1.42 -4.38 -3.75 -4.25 -1.42 -0.91 -3.13 -0.52 -0.91 0.46 
 (0.68) (0.71) (0.74) (0.62) (0.61) (0.53) (1.03) (0.98) (0.90) (0.70) (0.58) (0.74) 
             
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.22 0.16 0.25 0.20 0.16 0.25 
Observations 817 572 699 1,444 1,326 3,115 435 403 638 752 950 860 
Notes: All regressions include regional dummies (NUTS 1 level). Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. The dependent variable in a probit model is equal to one if a 
given household pursues a diversification strategy and is equal to zero if it pursues a relevant specialised strategy. 
Source: Own computations based on the annual Household Budget Survey conducted by Poland’s Central Statistical Office (CSO). 
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As a second step, we check whether the estimated propensity score is a balancing function. 
Table A1 in the Annex provides evidence on how well our matching approach balances 
distributions of the selected household characteristics across treated and controlled groups.21 
As shown, without matching, the null hypothesis of equal means is rejected for several cases. 
After matching, differences in means are reduced in most cases and remain significant in 
only a few cases. This shows that our matching strategy is successful in balancing important 
household characteristics across comparison groups. Thus, it provides a useful tool in 
identifying comparable observations, allowing us to design appropriate control groups so that 
each treated household can be matched with a similar ‘control’.  
5.2 Main results 
Having said that, we now turn to our main contribution and report the estimates of the effect 
of choosing a given income strategy on the treated households. Table 5 presents the earnings 
premium of households that rely on diversified income (i.e. combining two income sources 
including farming) in comparison to four types of specialised rural households. In this table 
we pool all diversified households in one category and do not distinguish between different 
combinations of diversified income. Several points are worth mentioning. To start with, it 
seems that diversified households fare better only than households relying solely on 
unearned income and this pattern is fairly consistent over the whole period under 
investigation (see panel D in Table 5). In contrast, and this is the second point to observe, 
diversified households performed worse than households relying solely on farming (panel A) 
or self-employment outside agriculture (panel C). Again, these differentials have been quite 
persistent over time. Moreover, the effects that we document seem to be economically 
important. Using the averages reported in Table 3, one can calculate that, for instance, the 
difference between returns from farming and diversified strategy accounts for 3 to 29% of 
farm households’ monthly disposable income per capita, depending on a year. The relative 
difference between returns from specialising in self-employment and combining farm and 
off-farm incomes is of similar magnitude. Third, an interesting pattern emerges when one 
compares diversified households and households specialising in off-farm hired labour (panel 
B). At first, that is, in the period 1998-2004, which preceded Poland's accession to the EU, we 
find some evidence suggesting that the latter strategy brought higher remuneration. This 
appears to have changed after the accession. In years 2005-07, the returns from these two 
strategies were statistically indistinguishable from each other. To what extent this new 
pattern is stable remains open, however, as in the last year of our sample specialising in hired 
off-farm labour again seems to be more profitable. The difference that we document for this 
last year accounts for 6% of the average monthly disposable per capita income of farm 
households and is statistically significant at 5% or 10% level, depending on the matching 
estimator used and the way we calculate standard errors.  
To investigate the effect of the year 2005 a bit further, we take a closer look at the pattern 
reported in panel C (referring to the comparison between diversified households and those 
relying solely on self-employment outside agriculture). Similarly to what we observe in panel 
B, starting from 2005, the difference between these two strategies is smaller than in previous 
years. When we use bootstrapping to calculate standard errors, it is even statistically not 
distinguishable from zero. These observations are consistent with the argument that among 
rural households in Poland these were the people related to farming who benefited relatively 
the most from the country’s accession to the EU. This in turn is supposed to be due to funds 
provided via the Common Agricultural Policy. Our findings cautiously suggest that this effect 
could also be observed for diversified households whose relative position is improving thanks 
to a considerable share of income coming from agriculture.  
                                                        
21 Again, due to a large number of possible comparisons (for subsequent years and subsequent income 
strategies) only test results for a sample of comparisons are presented. Additional results may be 
obtained upon request.  
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Table 5. Estimates of earning differentials (monthly disposable income per capita in PLN): Pooled diversified households (combining two 
income sources including farming) vs. single-source income strategies 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Panel A: Diversified households (combining two income sources including farming) vs. farming 
ATT11 -31.33 -53.24 -114.41 -246.45 -233.75 -47.48 -69.09 -116.57 -120.71 -160.13 -303.20 
 [47.00] [40.47] [43.02] [55.42] [59.01] [43.93] [54.65] [47.99] [50.03] [52.52] [70.23] 
 (53.12) (54.23) (61.55) (81.91) (68.93) (59.96) (67.56) (61.90) (71.79) (68.44) (95.86) 
ATTllr 1.19 -44.60 -125.31 -164.54 -172.74 -68.35 -52.10 -102.48 -73.08 -204.83 -215.53 
 [29.08] [30.50] [28.13] [25.66] [28.67] [28.38] [44.14] [30.94] [32.63] [41.46] [45.57] 
 (39.36) (39.89) (38.88) (52.45) (45.32) (45.71) (50.58) (40.79) (46.05) (65.12) (67.76) 
Panel B: Diversified households (combining two income sources including farming) vs. off-farm income 
ATT11 -2.64 -52.58 -114.29 -159.18 -72.78 -112.20 -125.01 -37.17 76.73 15.89 -83.50 
 [35.68] [38.85] [31.89] [37.77] [35.93] [40.13] [41.63] [35.39] [40.76] [35.60] [47.84] 
 (40.71) (42.42) (36.46) (59.14) (41.24) (42.44) (46.01) (44.01) (51.56) (46.90) (54.84) 
ATTllr -15.11 -76.81 -112.31 -158.65 -86.39 -112.01 -100.45 -58.44 57.80 31.67 -79.16 
 [29.58] [29.87] [27.28] [24.34] [29.43] [29.53] [34.89] [30.86] [34.29] [40.11] [44.58] 
 (32.71) (34.17) (31.91) (38.71) (32.04) (29.90) (37.44) (32.40) (38.30) (43.34) (50.31) 
Panel C: Diversified households (combining two income sources including farming) vs. self-employment 
ATT11 -58.26 -213.33 -171.80 -232.88 -300.11 -124.68 -110.82 -66.29 -84.02 -51.19 -127.35 
 [43.44] [52.86] [44.09] [54.50] [60.20] [43.16] [55.89] [54.56] [50.05] [43.41] [62.72] 
 (65.91) (106.86) (60.78) (80.99) (79.34) (64.41) (78.28) (75.47) (74.65) (83.81) (97.86) 
ATTllr -55.22 -275.08 -181.69 -297.95 -210.85 -153.39 -123.16 -82.41 -98.96 -80.72 -46.44 
 [33.56] [36.69] [31.39] [37.36] [38.00] [37.51] [39.16] [42.09] [38.26] [40.84] [49.82] 
 (55.99) (111.74) (56.76) (73.50) (69.10) (61.02) (73.21) (68.78) (64.26) (77.44) (71.75) 
Panel D: Diversified households (combining two income sources including farming) vs. unearned income 
ATT11 258.38 247.23 216.95 178.72 189.71 172.33 255.34 262.95 414.94 512.19 495.11 
 [35.23] [34.80] [33.86] [24.79] [34.37] [27.24] [37.71] [35.09] [39.78] [51.53] [43.31] 
 (43.32) (40.10) (39.86) (37.41) (37.83) (43.89) (41.65) (39.91) (44.32) (58.07) (56.60) 
ATTllr 268.98 246.19 210.27 181.62 191.27 185.23 232.72 254.73 394.64 488.09 483.45 
 [31.80] [30.98] [27.54] [24.56] [22.94] [27.88] [34.66] [28.11] [33.58] [41.08] [42.93] 
 (40.26) (36.88) (33.55) (30.64) (24.49) (34.22) (39.88) (28.99) (36.94) (47.25) (50.71) 
Notes: Diversified households are all households that combine two income sources (including farming) and their HHI is <= 0.58 (see main text for details). ATT11 = average 
treatment on the treated nearest neighbour estimator. ATTllr = average treatment on the treated local linear regression estimator. Robust standard errors are clustered by 
primary sampling unit in brackets. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) are shown in parentheses.  
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Table 6. Robustness checks to the definition of diversified households. Estimates of earning differentials (monthly disposable income per 
capita in PLN): Pooled diversified households (combining two income sources including farming) vs. single-source income strategies 
where the threshold for diversified household is HHI<=0.545 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Panel A: Diversified households (combining two income sources including farming) vs. farming 
ATT11 -122.09 -55.96 -189.24 -233.82 -109.59 -22.35 -51.30 -104.46 -73.07 -212.64 -194.44 
 [52.92] [43.57] [55.22] [46.99] [42.31] [45.27] [67.51] [52.84] [46.92] [65.93] [62.64] 
 (58.66) (53.18) (67.55) (67.79) (67.84) (66.94) (74.62) (74.00) (69.04) (85.61) (92.82) 
ATTllr -27.74 -60.36 -154.45 -205.84 -145.52 -82.23 -67.15 -121.43 -99.71 -189.19 -209.40 
 [33.02] [31.17] [33.16] [26.98] [25.05] [32.07] [49.18] [38.39] [32.49] [41.07] [46.66] 
 (41.78) (42.02) (40.77) (48.03) (51.85) (57.07) (53.51) (46.81) (50.63) (68.66) (69.14) 
Panel B: Diversified households (combining two income sources including farming) vs. off-farm income 
ATT11 -2.16 -79.72 -51.65 -201.20 -89.10 -111.31 -57.41 -56.60 12.81 15.45 -86.33 
 [43.93] [40.68] [38.03] [41.78] [41.60] [47.74] [52.07] [39.33] [47.37] [49.25] [59.98] 
 (48.95) (45.40) (44.71) (52.53) (50.03) (53.37) (54.73) (38.60) (49.19) (59.47) (69.57) 
ATTllr -16.17 -95.69 -90.89 -200.33 -97.44 -112.44 -99.20 -89.23 22.05 37.23 -59.29 
 [32.29] [30.70] [34.38] [28.33] [32.33] [34.40] [43.77] [36.08] [32.36] [43.62] [49.23] 
 (36.28) (35.84) (36.18) (42.31) (33.40) (38.37) (50.91) (36.49) (33.56) (48.63) (53.78) 
Panel C: Diversified households (combining two income sources including farming) vs. self-employment 
ATT11 -10.78 -175.44 -183.34 -254.92 -179.31 -234.02 -162.14 -161.78 -12.80 21.45 33.08 
 [52.14] [54.96] [52.40] [54.98] [59.96] [51.29] [66.53] [70.93] [64.99] [48.91] [77.73] 
 (74.64) (93.95) (82.51) (90.33) (89.51) (76.80) (89.34) (99.32) (81.09) (102.51) (97.41) 
ATTllr -5.84 -200.81 -178.81 -284.06 -175.49 -198.04 -138.47 -111.51 -74.07 -45.43 -35.21 
 [40.62] [44.94] [40.43] [45.60] [40.77] [45.90] [49.35] [54.31] [40.65] [53.47] [62.89] 
 (69.19) (85.91) (63.41) (89.76) (67.09) (70.46) (81.75) (81.97) (64.14) (97.49) (87.64) 
Panel D: Diversified households (combining two income sources including farming) vs. unearned income 
ATT11 230.23 176.95 243.25 152.80 200.32 137.99 185.38 253.79 325.11 453.47 541.37 
 [44.82] [40.94] [42.66] [32.64] [35.89] [45.12] [46.60] [32.52] [34.65] [52.47] [60.42] 
 (47.47) (49.98) (44.50) (39.33) (46.27) (50.88) (51.59) (40.21) (43.27) (60.81) (70.19) 
ATTllr 245.82 211.27 223.30 138.14 198.70 182.98 206.60 234.73 356.79 452.57 541.57 
 [35.43] [33.49] [35.55] [26.27] [27.46] [35.18] [45.67] [27.49] [30.88] [45.99] [53.25] 
 (43.20) (39.99) (37.63) (32.25) (27.82) (39.69) (52.07) (33.60) (35.92) (55.16) (61.26) 
Notes: Diversified households are all households that combine two income sources (including farming) and their HHI is <= 0.545 (see main text for details). ATT11 = average 
treatment on the treated nearest neighbour estimator. ATTllr = average treatment on the treated local linear regression estimator. Robust standard errors are clustered by 
primary sampling unit in brackets. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) are shown in parentheses. 
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To estimate the results from Table 5 that we have just discussed, we defined diversified 
households as those for which the HHI calculated over their two income sources is smaller or 
equal to 0.58 (suggesting the less important source of income contributing at least 30% of the 
total incomes). While this approach ensures that our diversified households have a more or 
less balanced contribution from both income sources, it may still be criticised as being too 
broad. Therefore, to test the robustness of our findings, we checked whether our results hold 
if we adopt a more stringent definition of diversification. More specifically, we re-estimated 
the specifications from Table 5 using the HHI smaller or equal to 0.545 and the HHI smaller 
or equal to 0.52. The former results are presented in Table 6, the latter on the other hand, 
due to space constraints, are not reported.22 What should be emphasised, however, is that our 
results are very robust to both of these tests. One thing that might be mentioned in relation to 
these additional specifications is that, for the last two years covered by our sample (2007 and 
2008), the relative advantage of households relying solely on self-employment over 
diversified households is no longer statistically significant. The relative better performance of 
households specialising in farming, however, is still very persistent and, compared to the 
years 2003-2004, it increases following Poland’s accession to the EU.  
As an additional robustness test (not reported), we checked if our results depend on whether 
farming is a dominant income source among the two sources used by diversified households. 
To achieve this we compared remunerations to various income strategies but this time 
limited our treated group to pooled diversified households for which farming provided at 
least 50% of income. Overall, this exercise confirms our general conclusions and our results 
remain qualitatively the same as before. Obviously, the differences between diversified 
households and households specialising in farming, especially after 2004, were not as big as 
before.  
As a final robustness check of the results presented in Table 5, we broadened the set of 
covariates used to estimate the propensity score to include as many interactions between 
independent variables as possible. This is done in order to gain some more credence that our 
results are obtained without violating the conditional independence assumption. Obviously, 
this strategy is applied only to specifications where we have enough observations so to avoid 
running into the so-called ‘curse of dimensionality’ problem. The relevant results are 
presented in Table A2 in the Annex. Again, with these tests we confirm the robustness of our 
general conclusions.  
In Table 7, we further investigate the patterns documented above and complement them with 
some additional information. Again our focus is on diversified households for which one 
source of income is farming. More specifically, instead of pooling all diversified households 
together, we now look at the relative performance of households pursuing specific 
combinations of available income sources. In particular, we distinguish households 
combining farming and hired off-farm income and households combining farming and 
unearned income. Providing a more detailed picture for households combining farming and 
self-employment is not possible due to the insufficient number of observations for this 
category. Each of the diversifying strategies that we can identify is then compared with a 
relevant specialising strategy, namely: relying solely on off-farm income and relying solely on 
unearned income, respectively.  
                                                        
22 These results are not reported for brevity reasons but may be obtained from the authors upon 
request. The same applies to any other robustness checks that we perform but not present here due to 
space constraints.  




Table 7. Estimates of earning differentials (monthly disposable income per capita in PLN): Various types of diversified income vs. specialised 
income strategies 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Panel A: Diversified households (combining farming and off-farm labour) vs. off-farm labour 
ATT11 88.54 43.60 101.59 -3.91 104.40 89.22 32.07 27.44 183.13 157.34 96.84 
 [39.87] [53.92] [45.79] [47.71] [59.95] [36.38] [45.93] [60.20] [59.84] [56.43] [55.03] 
 (46.38) (59.21) (54.77) (60.79) (64.45) (51.59) (60.42) (63.68) (58.43) (65.03) (67.59) 
ATTllr 56.46 39.11 72.46 -68.34 40.04 30.58 20.71 24.80 168.17 159.63 49.28 
 [31.56] [39.03] [35.54] [28.93] [46.06] [34.47] [36.66] [45.64] [44.52] [47.24] [50.59] 
 (36.59) (44.22) (34.38) (39.30) (47.53) (38.59) (41.34) (45.94) (47.45) (48.60) (57.58) 
Panel B: Diversified households (combining farming and unearned income) vs. unearned income 
ATT11 8.79 3.18 3.19 65.59 66.27 74.80 47.55 113.16 220.76 236.06 156.39 
 [47.38] [44.12] [43.36] [37.47] [36.04] [45.51] [49.81] [59.99] [61.18] [57.05] [78.34] 
 (57.37) (53.95) (49.48) (51.47) (45.62) (52.57) (68.39) (60.22) (68.22) (80.95) (79.34) 
ATTllr 20.83 48.53 26.54 56.94 33.62 68.20 45.85 121.24 221.61 233.86 185.63 
 [35.79] [37.68] [30.78] [37.03] [31.51] [35.05] [42.81] [42.12] [55.54] [53.56] [61.86] 
 (47.39) (41.78) (30.71) (42.48) (38.84) (39.68) (48.49) (45.69) (56.25) (69.84) (73.34) 
Notes: Diversified hh as defined in the title for each panel. The HHI threshold is <=0.58 (see main text for details). ATT11 = average treatment on the treated nearest neighbour 
estimator. ATTllr = average treatment on the treated local linear regression estimator. Robust standard errors are clustered by primary sampling unit in brackets. Bootstrapped 
standard errors (500 replications) are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 8. Earning differentials: Diversified households using farming vs. diversified households combining two off-farm income sources 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Panel A: Diversified households combining two income sources including farming (pooled) vs. diversified households combining two off-farm 
income sources (pooled) 
ATT11 -2.97 -56.81 -39.26 -92.43 -71.39 -88.01 6.50 4.63 43.39 65.88 -34.43 
 [29.80] [28.85] [25.90] [31.54] [21.86] [30.47] [33.30] [32.84] [35.80] [36.66] [42.72] 
 (39.11) (37.62) (33.69) (51.00) (35.56) (35.83) (43.65) (41.93) (34.94) (46.72) (47.46) 
ATTllr -7.39 -33.14 -33.87 -96.74 -57.29 -76.31 -50.71 13.08 46.39 63.78 -36.64 
 [22.88] [23.87] [19.64] [22.88] [16.94] [22.96] [25.31] [24.16] [24.05] [33.45] [34.78] 
 (36.16) (32.83) (25.27) (34.84) (26.35) (30.65) (31.09) (31.94) (31.36) (36.07) (44.56) 
Panel B: Diversified households combining farming and hired off-farm labour vs. diversified households combining two off-farm income 
sources (pooled) 
ATT11 43.81 81.71 116.19 47.54 76.82 68.17 -93.92 87.25 202.07 195.67 62.70 
 [50.45] [48.06] [54.92] [47.48] [56.59] [69.82] [74.79] [59.72] [53.42] [68.62] [80.97] 
 (68.73) (62.29) (55.80) (52.39) (71.12) (64.77) (85.52) (68.68) (65.12) (72.08) (98.74) 
ATTllr 63.43 104.22 139.61 -7.45 62.48 69.61 72.96 74.94 211.39 238.13 110.56 
 [36.83] [41.83] [41.34] [27.52] [40.00] [33.75] [39.22] [44.22] [42.86] [48.45] [49.25] 
 (44.99) (50.82) (44.07) (46.13) (49.29) (42.29) (45.49) (45.97) (49.00) (47.26) (70.89) 
Panel C: Diversified households combining farming and unearned income vs. diversified households combining two off-farm income sources 
(pooled) 
ATT11 -199.81 -153.07 -234.46 -243.52 -134.07 -153.26 -116.47 -133.55 -64.89 -27.10 -283.88 
 [71.07] [42.07] [38.68] [61.45] [48.47] [43.18] [49.50] [68.13] [52.92] [60.58] [81.47] 
 (85.79) (56.68) (51.84) (75.56) (59.35) (55.05) (64.06) (76.24) (65.18) (74.46) (91.78) 
ATTllr -199.17 -209.84 -209.66 -222.11 -203.39 -178.24 -175.68 -134.03 -98.43 -64.28 -298.89 
 [47.18] [31.56] [29.00] [39.41] [38.42] [34.03] [42.59] [42.63] [49.92] [56.46] [58.32] 
 (60.85) (39.51) (30.51) (45.62) (49.10) (48.88) (54.09) (54.16) (55.75) (68.08) (73.58) 
Note: Diversified hh as defined in the title for each panel. The HHI threshold is <=0.58 (see main text for details). ATT11 = average treatment on the treated nearest neighbour 
estimator. ATTllr = average treatment on the treated local linear regression estimator. Robust standard errors are clustered by primary sampling unit in brackets. Bootstrapped 
standard errors (500 replications) are presented in parentheses. 
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Overall, these new results (reported in Table 7) are consistent with those presented in Table 5 
and provide some support that what we uncovered above was not a mere coincidence. More 
specifically, as shown in panel B, our evidence suggests that households adopting a 
diversification strategy based on combining farming and unearned income performed better 
than otherwise similar households relying solely on unearned income. This finding is fully in 
line with the picture emerging from earlier comparisons when our treated group consisted of 
pooled diversified households. In contrast, compared to our previous results, we get a slightly 
different perspective when we look at diversified households that combine farming with hired 
off-farm labour. In this case (panel A), we no longer find that households relying solely on 
hired-off farm performed better than those combining two income sources prior to Poland’s 
accession to European Union. If any difference is statistically significant, it rather suggests 
that the diversifying strategy was more profitable. As before, we test whether these results 
remain stable to different matching estimators, and using ways to calculate standard errors 
we verify whether they are robust to these checks. We also test if these findings are robust to 
the HHI threshold used to define diversifying households. Due to data limitations, however, 
the only alternative threshold that we are able to use in this case is HHI<=0.545. For using 
the threshold 0.52, we have too few observations. Our results (not reported) are robust to this 
check.  
Further, we leave specialisation strategies aside and highlight the main differences between 
diversification strategies including farming and diversification strategies based on two non-
farm incomes. The relevant results are presented in Table 8. In panel A, we compare two 
pooled categories (all households with two income sources including farming vs. all 
households with two income sources without farming). The pattern that emerges from the 
data again is consistent with what we observed earlier, regardless of the matching algorithm 
that we use. More specifically, initially, diversified households having at least 30% of income 
from farming performed worse than otherwise similar households combining two non-
agricultural income sources. Starting from 2004, however, the difference between 
remuneration from strategies adopted by these two types of households has vanished. As 
before, we confirm this result by estimating additional specifications with HHI thresholds 
smaller or equal to 0.545 or 0.52 (not reported). To uncover this relationship further, in 
panels B and C, we provide some estimates where diversified households having income from 
farming are decomposed into more detailed categories: farming and hired off-farm labour; 
and farming and unearned income. As a comparison group, we use the pooled group of all 
households combining two income sources but having no income from farming. The evidence 
that we report suggests that combining farming and hired off-farm labour provided similar 
returns as having two non-farm incomes until 2005 and higher returns afterwards.23 On the 
other hand, combining farming and unearned income seems to have been less profitable than 
combining two non-farm incomes, practically speaking, over the whole period under study.  
Although interesting, the results presented above can be questioned as they are based on 
reported household income. It is often argued that publicly collected data do not cover all 
income sources because of Poland’s still large shadow economy, especially in rural areas. In 
our case the data do not contain any information on sources of income that are illegal. It 
might be argued that respondents could have tried to hide income sources that are not 
officially declared and that our estimates are therefore biased. Therefore, in order to check 
the robustness of our results, we repeat the matching exercise but his time using monthly 
expenditures (instead of monthly income) as our outcome variable. Our data contain quite 
precise information on household total spending, which is difficult to manipulate as it is 
constructed by summing up daily expenditures. The results of this robustness check (not 
reported) generally confirm our earlier findings. Obviously, these results cannot be identical 
to those based on earnings, as households might differ in their savings and investment 
                                                        
23 For 2008, however, these results are slightly less robust as the difference between these strategies, 
although being positive, is statistically significant only in specifications using a local linear regression 
estimator. 
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behaviour, experience different prices, farmers might consume some of their own products, 
etc. Nevertheless, they show that on average diversifying households spend more than 
households relying solely on unearned income, have similar levels of spending as households 
relying on hired off-farm labour and spend less than households relying on self-employment 
outside agriculture. Interestingly, however, we do not find such big differences in spending 
between diversifying households and farmers, which stands out from our earlier results. That 
said, these tests lead us to conclude that our earlier findings are quite robust.  
Overall, we conclude that in the period 1998-2008 households that combined two income 
sources, one of which was farming, performed worse than otherwise similar households but 
specialised in farming or households relying solely on self-employment outside agriculture. 
Until 2005, diversified households also fare worse when compared to otherwise similar 
households but specialising in hired off-farm labour. This pattern, however, has been 
reversed since 2005. It seems plausible to assume that this change could be attributed to 
Poland’s joining the EU and benefiting from the Common Agricultural Policy. What should 
be clearly stated, however, is that further investigation into this phenomenon is needed.  
Our results may provide some arguments into the debate about a relatively modest success of 
measures aimed at promoting income diversification in rural areas in Poland. In fact, they 
show, especially for the period preceding Poland’s accession to the EU, that diversifying 
households had lower incomes than otherwise similar households specialised in alternative 
occupations. Note that these results may also serve as an explanation of the more general 
pattern of agricultural labour adjustment sketched out from a more macroeconomic 
perspective (Dries & Swinnen, 2002; Swinnen et al., 2005). We provide evidence that shifting 
towards family farms during transition, a phenomenon observed at a macro level, had strong 
micro foundations in terms of financial returns. Our results also complement earlier studies 
on barriers to off-farm diversification (Chaplin et al., 2004). While these studies show that 
moving outside agriculture was hampered by low human capital and remote location, we 
argue that there might have been no financial incentive for this shift to happen.  
6. Conclusions 
It is generally believed that economic diversification of rural areas may contribute to more 
efficient resource allocation and help reduce poverty. This belief provides the rationale for 
encouraging farm households to diversify outside agriculture. While this resulted in a 
considerable share of public funds devoted to rural areas being spent to promote off-farm 
employment and the establishment of non-agricultural enterprises, our understanding of the 
incentives of farm households to combine farming with some non-agricultural activities 
remains limited. One of the main question, obviously, is how remuneration derived from 
combining farm and off-farm incomes compares to other strategies.  
In this paper, we took a closer look at this issue by examining an extensive dataset from 
Poland spanning 1998-2008. We focus on rural households with two income sources, one of 
which is farming, and compare them to households with a single income source and 
households with two income sources but not involved in agriculture. In theory, diversification 
could provide an attractive alternative to other income strategies as rural households may 
still use their agricultural assets while also pursuing profitable off-farm employment. 
Drawing on the propensity score matching method, we demonstrated, however, that in rural 
Poland returns from diversification are lower than those from farming. In general, our 
evidence suggests that they were also lower than returns from relying solely on self-
employment outside agriculture. In contrast, our results indicate that diversification is 
preferable in comparison to relying on unearned income (social allowances) and, especially 
after Poland joined the EU in 2004, comparable or preferable to specialising in hired-off 
farm employment. Similarly, starting from 2005-06, incomes in rural households relying on 
combined farm and off-farm income were comparable to incomes in households combining 
two off-farm incomes. That said, detailed analysis shows that important differences occur 
between various types of diversified households. For instance, households combining 
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farming and unearned income were relatively worse off than those combining farming and 
hired off-farm employment. In fact, households pursuing strategies based, at least to some 
extent, on unearned income performed worse than those relying on other strategies.  
Overall, our results cautiously suggest that over the period 1998-2008 farmers in Poland may 
have lacked financial incentives to (partly) quit agriculture. This is because households 
relying solely on farming performed better than otherwise similar households combining 
farm and off-farm incomes. This obviously should be seen against the caveat that our dataset 
does not allow us to observe a given household shifting from one income strategy to the 
other. In effect, we have to rely on comparisons between similar but not the same 
households. Future investigations using panel data with observations for households 
changing their rural occupations could shed more light on this issue.  
Furthermore, the relative improvement in the performance of households partly or fully 
involved in agriculture observed around the year 2004, that is, the time when Poland joined 
the EU, is in line with arguments stating that in rural areas these were mainly farmers who 
benefited from the accession. One may assume that this effect could be attributed to the 
Common Agricultural Policy funds. Whether this is indeed the case, however, and what are 
the exact transmission mechanisms through which this effect may happen are interesting 
areas for future research. 
Other potential extensions of our approach include, for instance, more careful examination of 
where the non-agricultural activities take place (whether in domicile/in town/abroad). 
Similarly, a closer look at wage employment could allow us to include a distinction between 
agricultural and non-farm wage employment.  
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Annex 
Table A1. Distribution of selected covariates across treated and control households 
(one-to-one matching) – 1998, 2003 and 2008 
 












Year  1998  
Variable 
















Age Unmatched 43,608* 45,429 43,608* 41,644 43,608 42,420 43,608 44,167 
 Matched 43,802 43,914 43,327 42,794 42,538* 40,169 44,069 45,332 
Gender Unmatched 1,259 * 1,135 1,259 1,254 1,259 1,204 1,259* 1,424 
 Matched 1,202 1,179 1,258 1,278 1,236 1,246 1,276 1,276 
Gender ratio Unmatched 1,190 1,159 1,190 1,141 1,190 1,123 1,190* 0,858 
 Matched 1,196 1,128 1,181 1,214 1,126 1,177 1,111 1,155 
Higher 
education Unmatched 0,025* 0,004 0,025* 0,087 0,025 0,045 0,025 0,008 
 Matched 0,000* 0,016 0,028 0,028 0,031 0,005 0,026 0,030 
Secondary 
education Unmatched 0,036 0,022 0,036 0,043 0,036 0,064 0,036 0,038 
 Matched 0,031 0,019 0,036 0,036 0,051 0,051 0,034 0,052 
Secondary 
vocational 
educ. Unmatched 0,137 0,100 0,137* 0,208 0,137* 0,274 0,137* 0,087 
 Matched 0,136 0,132 0,149 0,169 0,149 0,113 0,121 0,082 
Vocational 
education Unmatched 0,403 0,421 0,403 0,455 0,403 0,484 0,403 0,409 
 Matched 0,416 0,424 0,415 0,335 0,456 0,549 0,392 0,397 
Other hh 
member educ. 
same as hh 
head Unmatched 0,417 0,469 0,417 0,408 0,417 0,395 0,417 0,424 
 Matched 0,428 0,447 0,419 0,403 0,426 0,390 0,422 0,440 
Other hh 
member educ. 
better than hh 
head Unmatched 0,169 0,199 0,169* 0,239 0,169 0,242 0,169* 0,327 
 Matched 0,156 0,152 0,169 0,194 0,200 0,174 0,194 0,177 
Number of 
people below 
15 years old Unmatched 1,266* 1,115 1,266* 0,768 1,266 1,159 1,266* 1,546 
 Matched 1,226 1,245 1,065 1,173 1,246 1,415 1,323 1,332 
Number of 
people 
between 15 and 
65 years old Unmatched 3,043 2,703 3,043* 2,810 3,043* 2,573 3,043* 2,354 
 Matched 2,973 2,914 2,980 3,109 2,821 2,815 2,910 2,970 
Notes: Diversified households refer to households combining two income sources where one of them is farming 
and the HHI<=0.58 (see main text for the details). Diversified households comprise our treated group, whereas 
specialised households comprise a control group. 
* Denotes significantly different means at the 5% level between observations from the unmatched (matched) 
treatment group and from the unmatched (matched) control group in a t-test.  
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Table A1. continued - 2003 
 












Year  2003  
Variable 
















Age Unmatched 44,212 45,612 44,047 43,104 44,047 42,397 44,047 45,486 
 Matched 44,570 44,650 43,991 45,200 43,227 43,968 44,158 44,548 
Gender Unmatched 1,244* 1,127 1,257 1,288 1,257 1,240 1,257* 1,463 
 Matched 1,182 1,164 1,268 1,319 1,243 1,227 1,274 1,220 
Gender ratio Unmatched 1,186 1,240 1,175 1,140 1,175 1,190 1,175* 0,948 
 Matched 1,215 1,208 1,175 1,303 1,212 1,203 1,154 1,232 
Higher 
education Unmatched 0,000 0,000 0,027* 0,121 0,027* 0,068 0,027 0,017 
 Matched 0,000 0,000 0,030 0,034 0,027 0,016 0,029 0,017 
Secondary 
education Unmatched 0,056* 0,009 0,054 0,051 0,054 0,082 0,054 0,043 
 Matched 0,009 0,019 0,055 0,098 0,059 0,027 0,058 0,075 
Secondary 
vocational educ. Unmatched 0,132 0,093 0,128* 0,235 0,128* 0,301 0,128 0,137 
 Matched 0,117 0,122 0,140 0,136 0,146 0,195 0,124 0,091 
Vocational 
education Unmatched 0,528 0,519 0,514* 0,435 0,514 0,445 0,514* 0,420 
 Matched 0,565 0,500 0,515 0,494 0,573 0,514 0,506 0,515 
Other hh 
member educ. 
same as hh head Unmatched 0,364 0,401 0,354 0,399 0,354 0,445 0,354 0,397 
 Matched 0,393 0,369 0,366 0,340 0,373 0,373 0,361 0,402 
Other hh 
member educ. 
better than hh 
head Unmatched 0,180 0,134 0,202 0,241 0,202 0,205 0,202* 0,274 
 Matched 0,140 0,131 0,200 0,204 0,200 0,173 0,203 0,199 
Number of 
people below 15 
years old Unmatched 1,104 0,981 1,101* 0,688 1,101 1,096 1,101 1,178 
 Matched 1,112 1,136 0,996 0,919 1,060 1,049 1,100 1,046 
Number of 
people between 
15 and 65 years 
old Unmatched 3,204* 2,761 3,191* 2,791 3,191* 2,630 3,191* 2,605 
 Matched 3,023 3,079 3,081 3,094 2,946 2,968 3,116 3,075 
Notes: Diversified households refer to households combining two income sources where one of them is farming 
and the HHI<=0.58 (see main text for the details). Diversified households comprise our treated group, whereas 
specialised households comprise a control group. 
* Denotes significantly different means at the 5% level between observations from the unmatched (matched) 
treatment group and from the unmatched (matched) control group in a t-test.  
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Table A1. continued - 2008 
 












Year  2008  
Variable 
















Age Unmatched 47,219 47,683 47,219* 44,841 47,219* 44,157 47,219* 49,283 
 Matched 47,216 47,068 47,120 47,083 46,259 46,223 47,677 46,449 
Gender Unmatched 1,231* 1,167 1,231* 1,283 1,231 1,193 1,231* 1,493 
 Matched 1,192 1,199 1,237 1,215 1,191 1,211 1,253 1,263 
Gender ratio Unmatched 1,237 1,237 1,237* 1,156 1,237* 1,093 1,237* 0,914 
 Matched 1,265 1,212 1,239 1,253 1,233 1,155 1,229 1,147 
Higher 
education Unmatched 0,051* 0,008 0,051* 0,115 0,051* 0,115 0,051* 0,019 
 Matched 0,007 0,014 0,052 0,055 0,048 0,052 0,039 0,025 
Secondary 
education Unmatched 0,027 0,036 0,027* 0,066 0,027* 0,092 0,027 0,046 
 Matched 0,027 0,034 0,028 0,025 0,036 0,036 0,028* 0,077 
Secondary 
vocational educ. Unmatched 0,183 0,205 0,183* 0,246 0,183* 0,321 0,183 0,173 
 Matched 0,195 0,212 0,188 0,188 0,211 0,199 0,158* 0,088 
Vocational 
education Unmatched 0,514 0,530 0,514* 0,447 0,514* 0,423 0,514* 0,425 
 Matched 0,545 0,500 0,511 0,532 0,542 0,574 0,512 0,593 
Other hh 
member educ. 
same as hh head Unmatched 0,297* 0,426 0,297* 0,370 0,297* 0,393 0,297 0,338 
 Matched 0,315 0,332 0,305 0,258 0,319 0,251 0,309 0,312 
Other hh 
member educ. 
better than hh 
head Unmatched 0,117 0,148 0,117* 0,208 0,117* 0,223 0,117* 0,306 
 Matched 0,099 0,106 0,120 0,142 0,131 0,139 0,126 0,130 
Number of 
people below 15 
years old Unmatched 0,916 0,765 0,916* 0,730 0,916 0,879 0,916 0,884 
 Matched 0,849 0,873 0,865 0,788 0,880 0,817 0,902 0,895 
Number of 
people between 
15 and 65 years 
old Unmatched 3,126* 2,839 3,126* 2,756 3,126* 2,495 3,126* 2,406 
 Matched 3,051 2,962 3,108 3,132 2,932 2,984 3,000 2,902 
Notes: Diversified households refer to households combining two income sources where one of them is farming 
and the HHI<=0.58 (see main text for the details). Diversified households comprise our treated group, whereas 
specialised households comprise a control group. 
* Denotes significantly different means at the 5% level between observations from the unmatched (matched) 
treatment group and from the unmatched (matched) control group in a t-test.  
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Table A2. Robustness test to including interaction terms in the set of covariates. Estimates of earning differentials (monthly disposable 
income per capita in PLN): Pooled diversified households (combining two income sources including farming) vs. single-source 
income strategies 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Panel A: Diversified households (combining two income sources including farming) vs. farming 
ATT11 36.91 -74.67 -95.91 -139.61 -203.76 -126.25 -45.80 -102.35 -53.13 -249.70 -318.49 
 [43.73] [42.76] [48.09] [58.60] [43.83] [36.07] [38.44] [43.89] [47.36] [51.42] [62.57] 
ATTllr -7.47 -44.90 -123.21 -172.43 -189.97 -92.60 -65.96 -125.52 -54.59 -222.59 -284.30 
 [30.15] [29.85] [27.36] [27.25] [26.19] [27.24] [37.85] [32.94] [32.92] [37.01] [39.02] 
Panel B: Diversified households (combining two income sources including farming) vs. off-farm income 
ATT11 -22.29 -24.59 -136.66 -254.54 -95.01 -100.53 -59.54 -11.86 40.59 39.13 -73.41 
 [37.02] [34.81] [27.20] [37.04] [39.07] [42.35] [43.28] [39.31] [37.75] [40.34] [61.20] 
ATTllr -14.16 -72.69 -100.56 -183.56 -87.25 -103.55 -76.49 -46.30 47.52 35.92 -72.76 
 [28.94] [30.77] [27.01] [23.12] [29.87] [30.24] [35.46] [31.34] [32.21] [40.76] [45.98] 
Panel C: Diversified households (combining two income sources including farming) vs. self-employment 
ATT11 15.79 -239.90 -171.76 -297.14 -198.09 -144.88 -198.52 -123.39 -101.95 -59.49 10.15 
 [48.67] [57.76] [43.69] [55.68] [52.48] [54.62] [62.55] [45.92] [67.90] [57.78] [58.98] 
ATTllr -5.72 -240.92 -191.34 -250.88 -242.46 -181.41 -258.58 -148.66 -98.26 -85.21 7.15 
 [42.09] [43.51] [33.93] [30.23] [34.48] [35.89] [51.62] [30.46] [41.53] [50.48] [54.97] 
Panel D: Diversified households (combining two income sources including farming) vs. unearned income 
ATT11 259.53 237.90 253.16 185.19 215.46 219.77 204.48 235.04 374.50 427.67 546.76 
 [35.47] [35.55] [30.27] [24.37] [25.80] [38.70] [46.36] [32.06] [35.07] [53.74] [47.13] 
ATTllr 247.21 238.84 237.48 185.57 187.64 224.84 226.97 235.34 390.28 455.49 518.41 
 [29.37] [30.34] [28.61] [24.22] [23.13] [28.80] [34.71] [23.84] [33.05] [44.60] [43.82] 
Notes: Diversified households are all households that combine two income sources (including farming) and their HHI is <= 0.58 (see main text for details). ATT11 = average 
treatment on the treated nearest neighbour estimator. ATTllr = average treatment on the treated local linear regression estimator. Robust standard errors are clustered by 









The Factor Markets project in a nutshell 
 
Title  Comparative Analysis of Factor Markets for Agriculture across the Member States  
Funding scheme  Collaborative Project (CP) / Small or medium scale focused research project  
Coordinator  CEPS, Prof. Johan F.M. Swinnen  
Duration  01/09/2010 – 31/08/2013 (36 months)  
Short description  Well functioning factor markets are a crucial condition for the competitiveness and 
growth of agriculture and for rural development. At the same time, the functioning of the 
factor markets themselves are influenced by changes in agriculture and the rural 
economy, and in EU policies. Member state regulations and institutions affecting land, 
labour, and capital markets may cause important heterogeneity in the factor markets, 
which may have important effects on the functioning of the factor markets and on the 
interactions between factor markets and EU policies.  
The general objective of the FACTOR MARKETS project is to analyse the functioning of 
factor markets for agriculture in the EU-27, including the Candidate Countries. The 
FACTOR MARKETS project will compare the different markets, their institutional 
framework and their impact on agricultural development and structural change, as well 
as their impact on rural economies, for the Member States, Candidate Countries and the 
EU as a whole. The FACTOR MARKETS project will focus on capital, labour and land 
markets. The results of this study will contribute to a better understanding of the 
fundamental economic factors affecting EU agriculture, thus allowing better targeting of 
policies to improve the competitiveness of the sector.  
Contact e-mail info@factormarkets.eu 
Website  www.factormarkets.eu  
Partners 17 (13 countries)  
EU funding  1,979,023 €  
EC Scientific officer  Dr. Hans-Jörg Lutzeyer  
 
 
Comparative Analysis of Factor Markets 
for Agriculture across the Member States 
245123-FP7-KBBE-2009-3 
